STV2110 Politisk filosofi (V?r 2013)

Eksamen, STV 2110 Politisk filosofi, v?ren 2013

Det er tre alternativer. Kandidaten skal velge ett alternativ.

 

 

Alternativ 1

(a) I Second Treatise of Government begynner John Locke med den premissen at Gud har gitt verden til menneskene i kollektivt eie. Han argumenterer likevel for individets rett til unilateral ervervelse av objekter fra dette sameiet. Se p? f?lgende tekstutdrag:

 

§ 27: Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men.

 

Redegj?r mer utf?rlig for hvordan ervervelsen foreg?r. Legg s?rlig vekt p? ? presisere hvilken rolle ideen om selveierskap spiller. Illustrer gjerne redegj?relsen med et konkret eksempel.

 

(b) Se p? f?lgende tre tekstutdrag (fra henholdsvis Locke, Robert Nozick og Michael Otsuka):

 

§ 27: […] For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others. (Locke)

 

Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. […] [T]aking the earnings of n hours of labor is like taking n hours for another’s purpose. (Nozick)

 

Barring [med mindre det forekommer] unusual circumstances […], it is in principle […] possible to provide all of the badly off in a society with the opportunity to acquire enough worldly resources to generate a steady, generous, and lifelong flow of income from the investment, rental, or sale of these resources that allows them to better themselves to the same degree as able-bodied individuals who are themselves provided with the opportunity to acquire a fairly generous portion of worldly resources. (Otsuka)

 

Anta at folks medf?dte evne til ? arbeide er (sv?rt) ulikt fordelt. Dr?ft i hvilken grad Lockes teori om ervervelse kan forsvare (sv?rt store) forskjeller i fordelingen av folks velferdsniv?/beholdning av goder.


 

Alternativ 2

Nedenfor st?r det utdrag av Davis Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding og Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Gj?r rede for Humes argumentasjon. Knytt gjerne kritiske kommentarer til redegj?relsen.

 

1

Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea.

It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently [tidligere] felt, either by our external or internal senses.

 

2

It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment [ern?ring] and support of a human body.

 

3

Should it be said that, from a number of uniform experiments, we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; this, I must confess, seems the same difficulty, couched in different terms. The question still recurs, on what process of argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium, the interposing ideas, which join propositions so very wide of each other?

 

4

But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion. We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from a number of similar instances, and not from any single instance, it must arise from that circumstance, in which the number of instances differ from every individual instance. But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ. In every other particular they are alike.

 

5

… the influence of volition [viljen] over the organs of the body … is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must for ever escape our most diligent enquiry. …

 

6

Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver? This question would never embarrass us, were we conscious of a power in the former case, not in the latter. We should then perceive, independent of experience, why the authority of will over the organs of the body is circumscribed within such particular limits. Being in that case fully acquainted with the power or force, by which it operates, we should also know, why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no farther.

 

7

If we examine the particular laws, by which justice is directed, and property determined; we shall still be presented with the same conclusion. The good of mankind is the only object of all these laws and regulations. Not only it is requisite, for the peace and interest of society, that men's possessions should be separated; but the rules, which we follow, in making the separation, are such as can best be contrived to serve farther the interests of society.

 

Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a man's art or industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to give encouragement to such useful habits and accomplishments? … And that all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled, in order to secure mutual trust and confidence, by

which the general interest of mankind is so much promoted?

 

 

8

What … reason … could writers ever give, why this must be mine and that yours; since uninstructed nature sure never made any such distinction? The objects which receive those appellations [betegnelsene] are, of themselves foreign to us; they are totally disjoined and separated from us.

Where this [utility] enters not into consideration, nothing can appear more whimsical [lunefull], unnatural, and even superstitious, than all or most of the laws of justice and of property.

Were the interests of society no wise concerned, it is as unintelligible [ubegripelig], why another's articulating certain sounds implying consent, should change the nature of my actions with regard to a particular object, as why the reciting of a liturgy by a priest, in a certain habit and posture, should dedicate a heap of brick and timber, and render it, thenceforth and for ever, sacred.

 


 

Alternativ 3

Nedenfor st?r det utdrag av Friedrich Nietzsche, Moralens genealogi. Gj?r rede for Nietzsches argumentasjon. Knytt gjerne kritiske kommentarer til redegj?relsen.

 

 

1

Vi m? ha en kritikk av de moralske verdier, verdien av disse verdier m? selv trekkes i tvil – til dette arbeidet er det n?dvendig med kunnskap om de betingelser og omstendigheter som verdiene vokste ut fra, hvor de utviklet seg og forskj?v seg …

 

 

2

… det gjelder ? gjennomreise moralens uhyrlige, fjerne og s? skjulte land – moralen som virkelig var der, og som ble levd – med lutter nye sp?rsm?l og likesom med ?pne ?yne: Og er ikke det ensbetydende med for alvor ? oppdage dette land?

Det er jo opplagt hvilken farge som for en moralgenealog m? v?re hundre ganger viktigere enn bl?tt: nemlig gr?tt, det vil si det autentiske, det virkelig-bevisbare, det-som-virkelig-har-v?rt, kort sagt hele den lange historien til den dunkle hieroglyfskriften i den menneskelige moralfortid!

 

 

3

De to motsatte verdier … har utkjempet en fryktelig, ?rtusenlang strid p? jorden.

Slaveoppstanden i moral begynner med at ressentiment [nag] selv blir skapende og f?der verdier, ressentiment hos vesener som ikke har f?tt vist den egentlige reaksjon, nemlig gjennom handling.

Den enkle manns moral har seiret. … alt blir tydelig j?deinfisert, kristeninfisert eller p?belinfisert (v?r s? god, velg det passende ord!)

 

4

Akkurat p? samme m?te som folket skiller lynet fra dets gnister og betrakter gnistene som handling, som virkning fra et subjekt som heter lyn, slik skiller folkemoralen ogs? styrken fra styrkens ytringer, som om det bak den sterke finnes et indifferent substrat som det st?r fritt ? ytre styrke eller ikke.

 

5

Denne [svake] mennesketypen m? ha denne troen p? det indifferente valgfrie ?subjekt? fra et instinkt om selvbevarelse, selvbekreftelse, et instinkt hvor enhver l?gn pleier ? helligholdes. Subjektet (eller, for ? si det popul?rt, sjelen) har kanskje derfor inntil n? p? jorden v?rt det beste trosdogme fordi det store flertall av de d?delige, de svake og de undertrykte av enhver art muliggjorde det sublime selvbedrag ? fortolke svakheten selv som frihet, ? utlegge svakhetens ulike former som fortjeneste.

 

6

? forlange av styrken at den ikke ytrer seg som styrke, at den ikke er en vilje til ? overvelde, ? sl? ned motstand, vilje til ? herske, en t?rst etter fiender og motstand og triumfer, det er akkurat like meningsl?st som ? forlange av svakheten at den ytrer seg som styrke.

 

7

Sp?rsm?let ?Hva er en gitt katalog over goder og ‘moral’ verdt?? m? stilles under de forskjelligste perspektiver; man kan is?r ikke behandle sp?rsm?let ?verdifullt til hvilket form?l?? nyansert nok. Noe som for eksempel har synlig verdi med henblikk p? én rases evne til lengst mulig ? best? … ville slett ikke hatt den samme verdi hvis det hadde dreid seg om en sterkere mennesketype.

 

8

De som fra begynnelsen av er de forulykkede, de som er blitt meiet ned, som har brutt sammen – det er de, det er de svakeste som i h?yeste grad underminerer livet blant mennesker, som p? farligste vis forgifter og stiller sp?rsm?lstegn ved v?r tillit til livet, til mennesker og oss selv.

 

9

… alle bestrebelser henimot det hinsidige, det meningsl?se, det instinktfiendtlige, det naturstridige, det dyrefiendtlige, kort sagt de tradisjonelle idealer … er livsfiendtlige idealer, idealer som baktaler verden.

 

10

Og derfor, god luft! God luft! Og vekk, i alle fall, fra n?rheten av alle kulturens galehus og sykehus! Og derfor, godt selskap, v?rt selskap! Eller ensomhet om n?dvendig! … For at vi, nemlig, mine venner, i det minste enda en stund skal kunne forsvare oss selv mot de to verste epidemiene som nettopp kan v?re oppspart for oss – mot den store kvalmen ved mennesket! Mot den store medlidenheten ved mennesket!

 

11

… all vitenskap … er i dag ute etter ? snakke mennesket bort fra dets hittidige aktelse for seg selv.

 

12

 … om man sjekker saken fysiologisk, beror vitenskapen p? den samme grunn som det asketiske ideal: En viss utarming av livet er her som der forutsetningen – affektene er blitt kj?lige, tempoet langsommere, dialektikken har tatt instinktets plass, alvoret st?r skrevet i ansiktene og geberdene.

 

 

Publisert 27. juli 2015 12:53 - Sist endret 27. juli 2015 12:53