Reading list
Samuel Bowles: Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution, 2004. Princeton University Press.
Background readings
Mukand, S. and D. Rodrik: In Search of the Holy Grail: Policy Covergence, Experimentation, and Economic Performance.
Moene, K, M. Wallerstein and M. Hoel: Bargaining Structure and Economic Performance , in Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein (eds) (1993) "Trade Union Behaviour, Pay Bargaining and Economic Performance. Claredon Press, Oxford. K.
Coase, R.: The nature of the firm, Economica 4, 1937.
Alchian A. and H. Demzets: Production, information costs and economic organization, American Economic Review, 62, No. 5 (1972).
Marglin, S.: What do bosses do?, I Giddens & Hold, pp. 285-298. K.
Sen, A. : Labour allocation in a cooperative enterprise, Review of Economic Studies vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct. 1966).
Johansen, L: The Bargaining society and the inefficiency of bargaining, 1979. Kyklos, 32, No. 3. K.
Badcock L. and G. Loewenstein: Explaining Bargaining Impasse. The Role of Self-Serving Biases, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 11, No. 1 (1997).
Moene, K.O and M. Wallerstein: Collective bargaining versus workers ovnership, Journal of Comparative Economics 17 (1993), pp. 628-645. K.
Weitzman, M.L.: The simple macroeconomics of profit-sharing , American Economic Review, Vol. 75 (1985).
Sah, R.K. and J.E. Stiglitz: The architecture of economic systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (Sept. 1986).
Moene, K: Types of bureaucratic interaction, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 29 (1986). K.
Shleifer A. and R. Vishny: Corruption , Journal of Economics 1993.
Moene K. and M. Wallerstein: Social Democratic Labor Market Institutions: A Retrospective Analysis, in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. Sephens (eds.) "Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. 1999. Cambridge University Press. K.
Fehr, E. and S. G?chter: Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of Reciprocity, Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 14, No. 3 (2000).
Kornai, J.: Resource constrained versus demand constrained systems, Econometrica Vol. 47, No. 4 (1979).
Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson: Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality and growth in historical perspective, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, pp. 1167-1200.
Freeman, R: Are your wages set in Bejing, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (3).
Hall, R.E. and C.I. Jones: Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 1999, 114 (1).
Rodrik, D: How far will international economic intergration go, Journal of Economic Perspectives (winter, 2000).
Banerjee, A: A theory of Misgovernance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson: The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: an Empirical Investigation, American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 5.
North, D.C. and B.R. Weingast: Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England, Journal of Economic History, 48 (pp. 803-832).
Engerman, S.L and K.L. Sokoloff: Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA. In S.H. Haber (ed.) "How Latin America Fell Behind".