@ = available online
Lecture notes
@ Lecturer notes (will be uploaded on the semester page).
Background
@ Fehr, Ernst, and Armin Falk. “Psychological foundations of incentives.” European Economic review 46.4-5 (2002): 687-724.
Optional reading: @ Ariely, Dan. Payoff: The hidden logic that shapes our motivations. Simon and Schuster, 2016. ISBN: 9781501120046.
Standard theory of economic incentives (lectures 2-3)
@ Prendergast, Canice. “The provision of incentives in firms.” Journal of economic literature 37.1 (1999): 7-63.
Economic incentives and other motivations (lectures 4-5)
@ Frey, Bruno S., and Reto Jegen. “Motivation crowding theory.” Journal of economic surveys 15.5 (2001): 589-611.
@ Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini. “A fine is a price.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29.1 (2000): 1-17.
@ Heyman, James, and Dan Ariely. “Effort for payment: A tale of two markets.” Psychological science 15.11 (2004): 787-793.
@ Mellstr?m, Carl, and Magnus Johannesson. "Crowding out in blood donation: was Titmuss right?." Journal of the European Economic Association 6.4 (2008): 845-863.
@ Ariely, Dan, et al. “Large stakes and big mistakes.” The Review of Economic Studies 76.2 (2009): 451-469.
Optional reading: @ Gneezy, Uri, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel. “When and why incentives (don’t) work to modify behavior.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25.4 (2011): 191-210.
Reciprocity, efficiency wages and relative wages (lecture 6)
@ Gneezy, U. and J. A. List (2006): “Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments”, Econometrica, Vol. 74, pp. 1365–1384.
@ Alain C., E. Fehr, L. Goette (2014). Fair Wages and Effort Provision: Combining Evidence from a Choice Experiment and a Field Experiment. Management Science 61(8):1777-1794. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.1970.
@ G?chter, S. and C. Th?ni (2010) Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair wage–effort hypothesis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Volume 76, Issue 3, December 2010, Pages 531-54.
Optional reading: @ Greiner, Ben, A. Ockenfels, P. Werner (2011) Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment. Economics Letters, 111, 236-238.
Optional reading: @ Card, D., Mas, A., Moretti, E., & Saez, E. (2012). Inequality at work: The effect of peer salaries on job satisfaction. American Economic Review, 102(6), 2981-3003.
Group coordination, free riding and social dilemmas (lectures 7-8)
@ Kosfeld, Michael, Akira Okada, and Arno Riedl. "Institution formation in public goods games." American Economic Review 99.4 (2009): 1335-55.
@ Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American Political Science Association, 1997. American political science review, 92(1), 1-22.
@ Hauge K. E., K. A. Brekke, K. Nyborg and J. T. Lind (2018). Sustaining cooperation through self-sorting: The good, the bad, and the conditional. PNAS
@ Gürerk, ?zgür, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Bettina Rockenbach. 2006. “The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions.” Science, 312(5770): 108–11.
Optional reading: @ Herrmann, Benedikt, Christian Th?ni, and Simon G?chter. 2008. "Antisocial punishment across societies." Science 319.(5868): 1362-1367.
Optional reading: @ Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., & Villeval, M. C. (2003). Monetary and nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American Economic Review, 93(1), 366-380.
Optional reading: @ Chaudhuri, A. (2010): Sustaining Cooperation in Laboratory Public Goods Experiments: A Selective Survey of the Literature. Experimental Economics14(1): 47-83.
Purpose, Meaning and CSR (lecture 9)
@ Ariely, D., Kamenica, E., & Prelec, D. (2008). Man's search for meaning: The case of Legos. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(3), 671-677.
@ Chandler, D., & Kapelner, A. (2013). Breaking monotony with meaning: Motivation in crowdsourcing markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 90, 123-133.
@ Hedblom D., B. Hickman, J. List (2018). Toward an understanding of corporate social responsibility: Theory and field experimental evidence.
Gender wage gap (lectures 10-11)
@ Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund, 2010, “Explaining the Gender Gap in Math Test Scores: The Role of Competition” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(2) 129–144.
@ Croson, R and U. Gneezy, 2009, “Gender Differences in Preferences” Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 448–474
@ Andreas Born, Eva Ranehill, Anna Sandberg, 2018, “A man’s world? – The impact of a male dominated environment on female leadership” University of Gothenberg, Working Paper in Economics No. 744
@ Goldin, Claudia and Cecilia Rouse. 2000. “Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of “blind” auditions on female musicians”. American Economic Review 90(4) pp. 715–741.
@ Exley, Christine L, Muriel Niederle, and Lise Vesterlund. 2018. Knowing When to Ask: The Cost of Leaning-In. Working paper
Optional reading: @ Gneezy, Uri, Kenneth L. Leonard, and John A. List. "Gender differences in competition: Evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society." Econometrica 77.5 (2009): 1637-1664.
Optional reading: @ Blau, Francine D. and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2017. The Gender-Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations. Journal of Economic Literature 55(3), pp. 789–865.
Autonomy (lecture 12)
@ Falk, A., and M. Kosfeld. 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control." American Economic Review, 96 (5): 1611-1630.
@ Bernstein Ethan S. (2012) The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational Learning and Operational Control, Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2)181–216.
@ Gjedrem, W. G., & Rege, M. (2017). The effect of less autonomy on performance in retail: Evidence from a quasi-natural field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 136, 76-90 .
Optional reading: @ Bloom, N., Eifert, B., Mahajan A., McKenzie D., & Roberts, J. (2013) Does Management Matter? Evidence from India. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(1), 1-51.
Recognition & awards (lecture 13)
@ Blanes i Vidal, J., & Nossol, M. (2011). Tournaments without prizes: Evidence from personnel records. Management Science, 57(10), 1721-1736.
@ Kosfeld, M., & Neckermann, S. (2011). Getting more work for nothing? Symbolic awards and worker performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(3), 86-99.
@ Bradler, C., Dur, R., Neckermann, S., & Non, A. (2016). Employee recognition and performance: A field experiment. Management Science.