Primary readings:
Bar-On, D. 2013. ‘Expressive Communication and Continuity Skepticism. Journal of Philosophy 110(6): 293-330.
Bruge, T. 1979. ‘Individualism and the Mental’. Reprinted in Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carston, R. 2010. ‘Metaphor: Ad Hoc Concepts, Literal Meaning and Mental Images’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (3): pp. 295-321.
Crane, T. 2013. ‘The Structure of Intentionality’. In The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crane, T. 2013. ‘Thinking about Specific Things’. In The Objects of Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. 1978. ‘What Metaphors Mean’. Critical Inquiry 5(1): pp. 31-47.
Davidson, D. 1984. ‘On Saying That’. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eklund, M. 2005. ‘What Vagueness Consists In’. Philosophical Studies 125(1): pp. 27-60.
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Edited by J. McDowell. New York: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-5. (This book can be bought at Akademika bookstore).
Fodor, J. 1975. The Language of Thought. Hassocks: Harvester Press. Chapter 4 (especially pp. 174-195).
Frege, G. 1892. ‘On Sense and Reference’. In M. Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gillon, B. S. 1990. ‘Ambiguity, Generality, and Indeterminacy: Tests and Definitions’. Synthese 85(3): pp. 391-416.
McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Lecture III and postscript to lecture III.
Peacocke, C. 2001. ‘Does Perception have a Nonconceptual Content?’. The Journal of Philosophy 98(5): pp. 239-264.
Putnam, H. 1975. ‘’The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’. Reprinted in Mind, Languge and Reality (Philosophical Papers, Volume 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chapter 2.
Recanati, F. 2012. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 12-13, 16-17.
Rosenthal, D. 2010. ‘Expressing One’s Mind’. Acta Analytica 25(1): pp. 21-34.
Russell, B. 1912. ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’. In The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell, B. 1919. ‘Propositions: What they are and how they mean’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 2: pp. 1-43.
Travis, C. 2008. ‘On Constraints of Generality’. In Occasion-Sensitivity. Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, xi, §§111-222.
Secondary readings:
Crane, T. 1991. All the Difference in the World’. Philosophical Quarterly, 41: pp. 1–25.
Davidson, D. 1984. ‘On Saying That’. In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eklund, M. 2013. ‘Metaphysical Vaugeness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy’. Metaphysica 14(2): pp. 165-179.
Nanay, B. 2010. ‘Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery’. Philosophical Studies.
McDowell, J. 1984. ‘De Re Senses’. Philosophical Quarterly 34(136): pp. 283-294.
Prinz, J. 2002. Furnishing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chapters 1 and 2.
Recanati, F. 2012. Mental Files. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapters 1-4.
Sainsbury, R. M. 1996. ‘Concepts Without Boundaries’. In R. Keefe and P. Smith (eds.) Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Travis, C. 2011. ‘Thought’s Social Nature’. European Journal of Philosophy 19(4): pp. 585-606.
Wright, C. 1997. ‘The Indeterminacy of Translation’. In , p. 397-426. In B. Hale and c. Wright (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. Ch. 16