The Nature of Truth
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Many, perhaps most, philosophers would accept (A) that the concept of truth plays a pivotal role in our conceptual scheme, and that it is indispensable in giving a philosophical characterization of ourselves and our place in the world.? To mention some central cases, it appears that we need to appeal it in order to give an account of the nature of thought and language and their relations to the world, of the aims of science, as well as of logic - the character of sound reasoning.
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Now, the (apparent) centrality of the notion of truth lends urgency to the task of giving an account of the nature of truth.? However, a large number of philosophers would also agree that (B) truth has proved extremely resistant to elucidation:
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Two of the main alternatives, among traditional theories of truth, are correspondence and coherence theories of truth.? They illustrate the difficulties that we face in coming up with a substantive account of truth.? A central problem for correspondence theories is that they apparently end up making use of notions - like that of a fact - which presuppose the notion that they are meant to explain.? Coherence theories of truth, on the other hand, appear to be vulnerable to straightforward counter-examples.? In short, it seems that no one has yet been able to come up with a theory of truth which is neither false nor viciously circular.
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In a way, if you believe (A), (B) may not seem all that surprising: the reason why the notion of truth is so difficult to elucidate is simply that it is so fundamental.? (There are no more basic notions in terms of which it could be analysed.)
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However, there is a distinctly modern conception of truth – variants of which are known under such labels as ‘deflationism’, ‘disquotationalism’ or ‘minimalism’ - which holds that the notion of truth is neither deep nor difficult.? Rather, it is both easy to explain as well as ‘metaphysically trivial’? - which is to say that it has virtually no bearing on any important philosophical issue.
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The issue over deflationism – whether truth is a ‘metaphysically trivial’ notion or not – is arguably the most fundamental question facing any theorist of truth.? It will be main focus of the seminar.
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