FIL2208 syllabus autumn 2015
Giere, Ronald (1988), Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere, Ronald (2004), “How Models Are Used to Represent Reality”, Philosophy of Science 71, Supplement, S742–752.
Giere, Ronald (2009), “Why Scientific Models Should Not be Regarded as Works of Fiction”, In: Mauricio Suárez (ed.): Fictions in Science. Philosophical Essays on Modelling and Idealisation London: Routledge, 248–258.
Cartwright, Nancy (1999), The Dappled World. A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cartwright, Nancy, (1980) “ Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61: 75 - 84
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1996), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University Chicago Press.
Bailer-Jones, Daniela M (2003) “When Scientific Models Represent”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science17: 59–74
Grasshoff, Modelling the Astrophysical Object, in Falkenburg, Brigitte, and Wolfgang Muschik (eds.) (1998), Models, Theories and Disunity in Physics, Philosophia Naturalis 35
Frigg, Roman––– (2010b), “Models and Fiction”, Synthese, 172(2): 251–268
Godfrie-Smit (2009), “Models and Fictions in Science” Philosophical Studies, 143: 101–116.
Redhead, Michael (1980), “Models in Physics”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31: 145–163.
Nersessian, Nancy (2010), “Mental Modelling in Conceptual Change”, International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 1: 11-48
Contessa, Gabrielle (2010), “Scientific Models and Fictional Objects”, Synthese 172 (2), 215–229.