Pensum/l?ringskrav

 

L?reb?ker:

Jennifer Nagel, 2014. Knowledge. A very short introduction.  Oxford U.P. ISBN 978-0-19-966126-8

Peter Godfrey-Smith. 2003. Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago U.P. ISBN 978-0-226-30063-4

 

Artikler

*01. René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy.  (I-III).  Translated by Donald A. Cress.  1993. (Third Edition.)  Hackett Publishing Company. ISBN 0-87220-172-4. Side 59-81. Norsk utgave: Meditasjoner over filosofiens grunnlag. Oversatt av Asbj?rn Aarnes. Aschehoug & Co. 1992. ISBN 82-03-16943-0. Side 13-37.  Tilgjengelig i PDF: http://www.nb.no/nbsok/nb/85e3135493d839d91131400a118037bd.nbdigital?lang=no#5

02. Barry Stroud: The Problem of the External World.  I Barry Stroud, 1984.  The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism.  Oxford U.P. ISBN 9780198247616.  Chapter 1. Tilgjengelig via Oxford Scholarship online, fra UiO. DOI: 10.1093/0198247613.003.0001

*03. Catherine Z. Elgin: Skepticism Aside. I Joseph Keim Campell, Michael O'Rourke and Harry Silverstein (eds.). 2010.  Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. ISBN 9780262513968. Side 309-324.

04. Edmund Gettier: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? I  Analysis, 23.6 (June 1963). Side 121-123. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/3326922. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922

05. Alvin Goldman: Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. I Journal of Philosophy, 73 (20) (1976). Side 771-791. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/2025679. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025679

06. Linda Zagzebski: The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. I The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 174 (Jan. 1994), side 65-73. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/2220147. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220147

07. Tim Williamson: A State of Mind. I Williamson, 2002. Knowledge and Its Limits.  Oxford U.P. ISBN 0-19-825043-6. Chapter 2, side 21-48. Tilgjengelig via Oxford Scholarship online, fra UiO. DOI: 10.1093/019925656X.003.0002

08. Sally Haslanger: What knowledge is and what it ought to be. Feminist Values and Normative Epistemology.  I Haslanger, 2012: Resisting Reality.  Social Construction and Social Critique.  Oxford U.P.  ISBN 978-0-19-989262-4. Chapter 12, side 341-364. Tilgjengelig via Oxford Scholarship online, fra UiO. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676113

*09. Hilary Kornblith: Introduction: What is naturalistic epistemology? I Kornblith (ed.) 1994. Naturalizing Epistemology. (2. Edition).  MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-226-30063-4. Side 1-14.

*10. W.V. Quine: Epistemology Naturalized.  I Quine, 1969. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia U.P. ISBN 0-231-08357-2. Chapter 3. Side 69-90.

11. Jaegwon Kim: What is ”naturalized epistemology”? In J. Tomberlin (ed.) 1988. Philosophical Perspectives 2. Epistemology. Ridgeview. Side 381-405.  Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.2307/2214082. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214082

*12. Lynne Hankinson Nelson: Who Knows. I Nelson, 1990. Who Knows: From Quine to a Feminist Empiricism. Temple U.P. ISBN 0-87722-647-4. Chapter 6. Side 255-299, 357-361.

*13. Judith Baker: Trust and Rationality. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 68, (1987). Side 1-13.  Reprinted in Sosa, E. et al. (eds.) 2008. Epistemology: An Anthology. (3. Edition). Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4051-6966-0.  Side 807-814.

14.  Jennifer Lackey: Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.  The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 197 (Oct. 1999). Side 471-190.  Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660497

15. Gail Stine: Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure.  Philosophical Studies 29 (1976), side 249-261. Tilgjengelig online via Springer (http://link.springer.com/journal/11098/29/4/page/1), fra UiO.

*16. Keith DeRose: Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. I J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds.), 1999. The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-631-20291-0.  Side 187-205.

*17.  Rudolf Carnap: Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.  I Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 11 (1950).  Side 20-40.

*18. Nelson Goodman: The new riddle of induction. I Goodman (1983 (1954)),  Fact Fiction and Forecast, Harvard U.P. ISBN  0674290712, side 59-83.

*19. Karl Popper: Science: Conjectures and Refutations.  I Popper (2002 (1963)), Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2nd edition.  Routledge. ISBN 0415285941. Side 42-86.

*20. Thomas Kuhn: Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice.  In Kuhn (1977), The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-45806-7. Side 320-339.

*21. Elizabeth Anderson: Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology. Philosophical Topics 23 (2) (1995). Side 27-58.  

22. Helen Longino: Can There Be A Feminist Science?  Hypatia, Vol. 2, No. 3, Feminism & Science, 1 (Autumn, 1987). Side 51-64. Tilgjengelig online via JSTOR.ORG fra UiO. DOI: 10.1111/j.1527-2001.1987.tb01341.x

23. Sharon Crasnow: Feminist Philosophy of Science: Values and Objectivity. I Philosophy Compass. 8 (4), side 413-423. Tilgjengelig online: DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12023

*24. Helen Longino:  Taking Social Studies of Science Seriously. In Longino (2001). The Fate of Knowledge.  Princeton U.P. ISBN: 0691088764. Kapittel 2, side 11-41.

25. Jim Woodward: Laws, Causes, and Invariance. In Stephen Mumford and Matthew Tugby (eds.) 2013.  Metaphysics and Science. Oxford U.P. Tilgjengelig via Oxford Scholarship online, fra UiO. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199674527.003.0003

 

 

*Finnes i kompendium for emnet. 

 

Anbefalte ressurser: 

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://www.iep.utm.edu

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu

 

 

Publisert 18. mai 2017 15:07 - Sist endret 18. mai 2017 15:07